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The most exciting hypothesis in cognitive science right now is the theory that cognition
is embodied. Like all good ideas in cognitive science, however, embodiment immediately
came to mean six different things. The most common definitions involve the straight-
forward claim that “states of the body modify states of the mind.” However, the implica-
tions of embodiment are actually much more radical than this. If cognition can span the
brain, body, and the environment, then the “states of mind” of disembodied cognitive sci-
ence won’t exist to be modified. Cognition will instead be an extended system assembled
from a broad array of resources.Taking embodiment seriously therefore requires both new
methods and theory. Here we outline four key steps that research programs should follow
in order to fully engage with the implications of embodiment. The first step is to conduct
a task analysis, which characterizes from a first person perspective the specific task that
a perceiving-acting cognitive agent is faced with. The second step is to identify the task-
relevant resources the agent has access to in order to solve the task.These resources can
span brain, body, and environment.The third step is to identify how the agent can assemble
these resources into a system capable of solving the problem at hand. The last step is to
test the agent’s performance to confirm that agent is actually using the solution identified
in step 3. We explore these steps in more detail with reference to two useful examples
(the outfielder problem and the A-not-B error), and introduce how to apply this analysis to
the thorny question of language use. Embodied cognition is more than we think it is, and
we have the tools we need to realize its full potential.
Keywords: embodied cognition, dynamical systems, replacement hypothesis, robotics, outfielder problem,A-not-B
error, language
INTRODUCTION
The most exciting idea in cognitive science right now is the theory
that cognition is embodied. It is, in fact one of the things inter-
ested lay people know about cognitive science, thanks to many
recent high profile experiments. These experiments claim to show
(1) how cognition can be influenced and biased by states of the
body (e.g., Eerland et al., 2011) or the environment (Adam and
Galinsky, 2012) or (2) that abstract cognitive states are grounded
in states of the body and using the former affects the latter (e.g.,
Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Miles et al., 2010).
The problem, however, is that this is not really what embod-
ied cognition is about. Embodiment is the surprisingly radical
hypothesis that the brain is not the sole cognitive resource we
have available to us to solve problems. Our bodies and their per-
ceptually guided motions through the world do much of the work
required to achieve our goals, replacing the need for complex inter-
nal mental representations. This simple fact utterly changes our
idea of what“cognition”involves, and thus embodiment is not sim-
ply another factor acting on an otherwise disembodied cognitive
processes.
Many cognitive scientists, see this claim occupying the extreme
end of an embodiment continuum, and are happy with the notion
that there can be many co-existing notions of embodiment –
maybe three (Shapiro, 2011) or even six (Wilson, 2002). Why
rule out other research programs that seem to be showing results?
Why not have one strand of embodied cognition research that
focuses on how cognition can be biased by states of the body, and
another strand that focuses on brain-body-environment cognitive
systems? The issue is that the former type of research does not fol-
low through on the necessary consequences of allowing cognition
to involve more than the brain. These consequences, we will argue,
lead inevitably to a radical shift in our understanding of what cog-
nitive behavior is made from. This shift will take cognitive science
away from tweaking underlying competences and toward under-
standing how our behavior emerges from the real time interplay
of task-specific resources distributed across the brain, body, and
environment, coupled together via our perceptual systems.
This paper will proceed as follows. After laying out the stan-
dard cognitive psychological approach to explaining behavior,
we’ll briefly point to some interesting lines of empirical research
from robotics and animal cognition that support the stronger
replacement hypothesis of embodied cognition (Shapiro, 2011).
We’ll then lay out a recommended research strategy based on
this work. Specifically, we will detail how to use a task analy-
sis to identify the cognitive requirements of a task and the
resources (in brain, body, and environment) available to fill
these requirements. According to this analysis, it is the job of
an empirical research program to find out which of the avail-
able resources the organism is actually using, and how they have
been assembled, coordinated, and controlled into a smart, task-
specific device for solving the problem at hand (Runeson, 1977;
Bingham, 1988). We’ll focus on two classic examples in detail:
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the outfielder problem (e.g., McBeath et al., 1995) and the A-
not-B task (e.g., Thelen et al., 2001). We’ll then contrast this
task-specific approach with some embodied cognition research
in the standard cognitive psychology mold, and see how this lat-
ter research fails to successfully motivate any role for the body or
environment, let alone the one identified in the research. Finally,
we’ll conclude with some thoughts on how to begin to apply
this approach to one of the harder problems in cognitive sci-
ence, specifically language use. Language is the traditional bête
noir of this more radical flavor of embodiment, and our goal in
this final section will be to demonstrate that, with a little work,
a truly embodied analysis of language can, in fact, get off the
ground.
STANDARD COGNITIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR BEHAVIOR
The insight of early cognitive psychologists was that our behavior
appears to be mediated by something internal to the organism. The
classic example is Chomsky’s (1959) critique of “Verbal Behavior”
(Skinner, 1957) in which he argues that language learning and use
cannot be explained without invoking mental structures (in this
case, innate linguistic capabilities). In general, the theoretical enti-
ties cognitive psychologists invoke to do this internal mediation
are mental representations.
At the time these ideas were taking off, research on percep-
tion suggested that our perceptual access to the world wasn’t very
good (see Marr, 1982; Rock, 1985 for reviews). This creates the fol-
lowing central problem for representations to solve. The brain is
locked away inside our heads with only impoverished, probabilistic
perceptual access to the world, but it has the responsibility of coor-
dinating rapid, functional, and successful behavior in a dynamic
physical and social environment. Because perception is assumed
to be flawed, it is not considered a central resource for solving
tasks. Because we only have access to the environment via percep-
tion, the environment also is not considered a central resource.
This places the burden entirely on the brain to act as a storehouse
for skills and information that can be rapidly accessed, parame-
terized, and implemented on the basis of the brain’s best guess as
to what is required, a guess that is made using some optimized
combination of sensory input and internally represented knowl-
edge. This job description makes the content of internal cognitive
representations the most important determinant of the structure
of our behavior. Cognitive science is, therefore, in the business of
identifying this content and how it is accessed and used (see Dietrich
and Markman, 2003 for a discussion of this).
Advances in perception-action research, particularly Gibson’s
work on direct perception (Gibson, 1966, 1979), changes the
nature of the problem facing the organism. Perception is not
critically flawed. In fact, we have extremely high quality, direct per-
ceptual access to the world. This means that perception (and by
extension, the environment) can be a useful resource, rather than a
problem to be overcome by cognitive enrichment. Embodied cog-
nition (in any form) is about acknowledging the role perception,
action, and the environment can now play.
A radical conclusion emerges from taking all this seriously: if
perception-action couplings and resources distributed over brain,
body, and environment are substantial participants in cognition,
then the need for the specific objects and processes of standard
cognitive psychology (concepts, internally represented compe-
tence, and knowledge) goes away, to be replaced by very different
objects and processes (most commonly perception-action cou-
plings forming non-linear dynamical systems, e.g., van Gelder,
1995). This, in a nutshell, is the version of embodiment that
Shapiro (2011) refers to as the replacement hypothesis and our
argument here is that this hypothesis is inevitable once you allow the
body and environment into the cognitive mix. If such replacement
is viable, then any research that keeps the standard assumptions
of cognitive psychology and simply allows a state of the body to
tweak cognition misses the point. To earn the name, embodied
cognition research must, we argue, look very different from this
standard approach.
EMBODIED COGNITION: FOUR KEY QUESTIONS
The core question in psychology is why does a given behavior have
the form that it does? The standard cognitive psychology explana-
tion for the form of behavior is that it reflects the contents and
operation of an internal algorithm (implemented as a mental rep-
resentation) designed to produce that behavior on demand (e.g.,
Fodor, 1975, 2008). The work discussed below replaces complex
internal control structures with carefully built bodies perceptually
coupled to specific environments. (Of course, embodied cognition
solutions will also sometimes require internal control structures.
Critically, though, these internal control structures are taking part
in the activity of distributed perceptually coupled systems from
which behavior emerges online, in real time, in a context. Thus,
explicit representations of behavior or knowledge have no place in
embodied solutions.)
To get a rigorous handle on this claim, we suggest that there
are four key questions any embodied cognition research program
must address:
1. What is the task to be solved? Embodied cognition solutions
solve specific tasks, not general problems, so identifying how
an organism produces a given behavior means accurately iden-
tifying the task it is trying to solve at the time. Taking things
one task at a time opens up the possibility of smart solutions
(Runeson, 1977). Organisms using smart solutions solve partic-
ular problems using heuristics made possible by stable features
of the task at hand, rather than general purpose rote devices
which apply algorithms to solve the task. For common tasks,
smart solutions are typically more efficient, more stable, and
more economical than rote solutions (e.g., Zhu and Bingham,
2008, 2010).
2. What are the resources that the organism has access to in order
to solve the task? Embodied cognition implies that there are
resources, plural, available to the organism. These resources
include the brain but also the body, the environment, and the
relations between these things (e.g., the motion of our bod-
ies through the environment). A task analysis should include
an exhaustive list of resources available that might contribute,
beginning with those available via perception and action and
only hypothesizing more complex cognitive resources once the
capabilities of these other resources have been exhausted. An
exhaustive list is possible if you are able to characterize your
task formally; tasks are differentiated from each other in terms
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of their underlying dynamics (e.g., Bingham, 1995) and thus it
is becoming common practice to formalize the task description
using the tools of dynamical systems (e.g., Fajen and Warren,
2003; Bingham, 2004a,b; Schöner and Thelen, 2006).
3. How can these resources be assembled so as to solve the task?
Solving a specific task means creating a smart, task-specific
device that can do the job (Bingham, 1988). To be more specific,
it means assembling the required resources into a dynamical
system that solves the task at hand as its behavior unfolds over
time. Remember, these resources can be distributed over brain,
body, and environment. Since we only have access to infor-
mation about our bodies and the environment via perception,
an embodied analysis must include a detailed account of the
perceptual information used to connect the various resources
(Golonka and Wilson, 2012).
4. Does the organism, in fact, assemble, and use these resources? It
is always an empirical question whether the dynamical system
hypothesized in step 3 is, in fact, an accurate description of the
system the organism has assembled to solve the task. The basic
experimental tool for establishing the identity of a dynamical
system is the perturbation experiment; systems respond to per-
turbations of resources in a manner that is specific to the role
that resource plays in the system, and this allows you to map
the composition and organization of the system at hand (e.g.,
Kay et al., 1987, 1991; Wilson and Bingham, 2008).
The next sections will review what this new research looks like
in practice; we will begin with some simpler cases that tackle and
clarify some of our key questions, and end up with two cases of
human behavior that demonstrate how to tie these four questions
into a coherent research program.
EMBODIMENT IN ACTION
EMBODIMENT IN ACTION I: ROBOTS
One of the most productive areas to demonstrate the strength
of the replacement hypothesis is robotics. Robots built on the
principles of embodiment are capable of interestingly complex
behavior, demonstrating how far you can get without represen-
tational enrichment. When you build something yourself from
scratch, you know exactly what is (and is not) included in the con-
trol systems. This means that your pool of potential explanations
for a given behavior is constrained and enumerated, and you can
answer questions 2 and 3 in great detail.
“Swiss” robots
An early example of embodied cognition robotics comes from
Maris and te Boekhorst (1996), who built small Didabots with
infra-red detectors placed around their body and a very simple
internal control structure: a single rule,“turn away from a detected
obstacle.” In this paper, the detector at the front of the robot was
deactivated – the robot could no longer “see” anything directly
ahead, but it could “see” off to the sides and behind. If it hit
an obstacle (a white block) head on, it simply kept moving and
pushed the block along until it turned to avoid the next obsta-
cle (either another block or a wall). The first block was then left
behind, and the net result (if there was more than one robot at
work) was that the randomly scattered blocks were “tidied up”
into heaps. This tidying behavior is not specified in the control
structure of the robots; it emerges, in real time, from the relation-
ship between the rule, the environment (the size and number of
obstacles, the presence, or absence of other robots), and the bodies
of the robots (the working front sensors have to be far enough
apart to allow a block to fit, or else the robot simply successfully
avoids the blocks). Importantly, then, the robots are not actually
tidying – they are only trying to avoid obstacles, and their errors,
in a specific extended, embodied context, leads to a certain sta-
ble outcome that looks like tidying (see also Pfeifer and Scheier,
1999; Pfeifer and Bongard, 2007 for extended reviews of this style
of robotics). Understanding the resources the robots had available
and how they were organized was what enabled the researchers to
identify that the robots were not, in fact, trying to tidy anything
up.
Locomotion and passive dynamics
Why does walking have the form that it does? One explanation
is that we have internal algorithms which control the timing and
magnitude of our strides. Another explanation is that the form of
walking depends on how we are built and the relationship between
that design and the environments we move through.
Considering the resources available to solve this task high-
lights the centrality of an organism’s design. Humans don’t walk
like lions because our bodies aren’t designed like lions’ bodies.
The properties of our design are referred to as passive dynam-
ics (McGeer, 1990). How are the segments arranged? How are
they connected to each other? How springy are the connec-
tions? Robotics work on walking show that you can get very
far in explaining why walking has a particular form just by
considering the passive dynamics. For example, robots with no
motors or onboard control algorithms can reproduce human
gait patterns and levels of efficiency simply by being assem-
bled correctly (e.g., Collins et al., 2005)1. Work at MIT has
added simple control algorithms to this kind of system, which
allows the robots to maintain posture and control propulsion
more independently. The same algorithm can produce a wide
variety of locomotion behaviors, depending on which robotic
body they control (e.g., Raibert, 1986)2. None of these sys-
tems include a representation of the final form of their loco-
motion; this form emerges in real time from the interaction of
the passive dynamics with the environment during the act of
moving. These robots demonstrate how organisms might use
distributed task resources to replace complex internal control
structures.
Robot crickets
A fascinating example of embodiment in nature has been repli-
cated in the lab in the form of a robot (see Barrett, 2011 for
the more detailed analysis of this case that we draw from here).
Female crickets need to find male crickets to breed with. Females
prefer to breed with males who produce the loudest songs. This
means that the task facing female crickets is to find the males
who sing the loudest. What resources do they use to solve this
1http://ruina.tam.cornell.edu/research/ for videos and more details of these robots.
2http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/leglab/ for videos and more details.
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task? Female crickets have a pair of eardrums, one on each front
leg, which are connected to each other via a tube. Sounds enter-
ing from the side activate that side’s eardrum directly, and also
travel through the tube from the other eardrum as well. These
signals are out of phase if the sound is off to one side, and this
increases the amplitude of that side’s eardrum’s response; this
arrangement is therefore directional. This explains how the female
can tell what direction a sound is coming from, but it doesn’t
explain how she uses this information to move toward this sound
or how she manages to tune in to crickets of her own species.
It so happens that the eardrums connect to a small number of
interneurons that control turning; female crickets always turn in
the direction specified by the more active interneuron. Within
a species of cricket, these interneurons have a typical activation
decay rate. This means that their pattern of activation is maxi-
mized by sounds with a particular frequency. Male cricket songs
are tuned to this frequency, and the net result is that, with no
explicit computation or comparison required, the female cricket
can orient toward the male of her own species producing the
loudest song. The analysis of task resources indicates that the
cricket solves the problem by having a particular body (eardrum
configuration and interneuron connections) and by living in a par-
ticular environment (where male crickets have songs of particular
frequencies).
Webb (1995, 1996) have built robots that only have these
basic capacities, and these robots successfully reproduce the form
of the female cricket’s exploratory behavior. The robots have
no stored information about the male cricket’s songs, and sim-
ply perceive and act using a particularly arranged body. It is
clear that the robot doesn’t explicitly implement “choosing the
male with the strongest song”; finding him is simply the result
of this embodied strategy operating in the context of mul-
tiple male crickets singing and is driven (this robotics work
predicts) by the onset of chirps within the song. The suc-
cess of this work results from carefully analyzing the task at
hand, identifying available resources, and specifying how these
resources are assembled by the agent (questions 1–3 outlined
above).
Summary
This robotics work and more like it (e.g., Brooks, 1999; Pfeifer and
Scheier, 1999; Beer, 2003; Pfeifer and Bongard, 2007) reveal a great
deal of complex behavior (from tidying, to locomotion, to mate
selection) can emerge from placing the right type of body into a
specific environmental context, without any explicit representa-
tion of the form of that behavior anywhere in the system. This
work is a proof of concept that embodiment and embedding can
therefore replace internal algorithms and lead to stable, functional
behavior.
EMBODIMENT IN ACTION II: ANIMALS
The robot work is fascinating is one part of a strong argument
in favor of the replacement hypothesis. Of course, the next criti-
cal step is to establish whether biological organisms actually take
advantage of these embodied solutions (question 4) or whether
they follow a different, more computational path.
Crickets again
Webb’s robot crickets implement a simple embodied perception-
action strategy to perform mate selection. A hypothesis that
follows from this work is that females use the onset of a male’s
song to drive exploration, rather than attending to the entire song
and “choosing” the best one. Observation of real crickets shows
that female crickets do indeed move before they could possibly
have processed an entire song, supporting this embodied “chirp
onset” hypothesis (Hedwig and Webb, 2005; see also Barrett, 2011
for an overview).
Swarming, herding, hunting
Many animals produce carefully coordinated activities with large
numbers of conspecifics. Forming large groups (swarms, or herds,
or flocks) is a valuable defense against predators, and maintaining
these groups requires ongoing coordination across many individ-
uals. This coordination is not centrally controlled, however, and is
not the result of an explicit attempt to maintain a swarm. Instead,
the coordination emerges from and is maintained by the oper-
ation of straight-forward perception-action coupling rules in a
suitable context. Bird flocking is elegantly explained as a coupling
between individuals constrained by three principles (Reynolds,
1987): separation (avoid crowding neighbors), alignment (steer
toward average heading of neighbors), and cohesion (steer toward
average position of neighbors). Interestingly, cohesion exhibits
asymmetries that relate to the perceptual capabilities of birds; the
average position is a center of mass of only the nearest 5–10 birds,
weighted in favor of birds off to the side (reflecting the field of
view for bird vision; Ballerini et al., 2007). Sheep herding is simi-
larly straight-forward. Sheep head for the geometric center of the
flock when a predator approaches, implementing a “selfish herd”
strategy without any individual in the herd being “selfish” per se
(Hamilton, 1971; King et al., 2012).
A more complex example of coordinated social activity is the
pack hunting of wolves. The pattern of their activity, however,
is readily explained by two simple rules: (1) move toward the
prey until a minimum safe distance is reached, and then (2)
move away from any other wolves that are also close to the prey
(Muro et al., 2011). No leader is required, no instructions need
be given; the form of the group’s hunting activity emerges from a
simple perception-action coupling strategy implemented by each
individual, operating in a specific context.
Continuing the hunting theme, Barrett (2011) has an extended
discussion on what she refers to as “the implausible nature of
Portia,” the jumping spider. Portia is capable of some remark-
able feats: deceptive mimicry, creating diversions to distract prey,
and taking extended detours in order to sneak up on dinner. This
last is especially impressive – detours mean Portia must oper-
ate for extended periods without direct perceptual contact with
its prey animal. This would seem to require some form of route
planning (Heil, 1936; Barrett, 2011). As Barrett notes, this hypoth-
esis seemed initially plausible because of the way in which Portia
scans its environment – prior to taking the detour, it will sit
and sway from side to side, seemingly evaluating potential routes
and making a selection. However, this scanning behavior, coupled
with the anatomy of the spider’s eyes, is actually an embodied
strategy that enables Portia to generate successful detours using
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currently available perceptual information (e.g., Tarsitano and
Jackson, 1997; Tarsitano and Andrew, 1999); Portia is perceiving,
not planning.
Summary
The advantage of examples from the animal literature is that
researchers are less likely to want to attribute performance to
complex internal representations (only less likely, of course; the
temptation is always there – Kennedy, 1992; Barrett, 2011). How-
ever, once we identify that embodied, situated perception-action
couplings can produce complex adaptive behavior in other ani-
mals, it becomes more difficult to deny the existence of such
solutions in our own repertoire unless one wishes to deny the evo-
lutionary continuity between ourselves and the rest of the animal
kingdom.
EMBODIMENT IN ACTION III: PEOPLE
We will now review in some detail two excellent examples of
successful replacement style embodied cognition in psychology.
These examples are the outfielder problem and the A-not-B error
(see Clark, 1999; Smith and Gasser, 2005 for other uses of these
examples). They are useful because (a) they address all four key
questions of good embodiment research and (b) both examples
have standard cognitive psychology explanations that have been
successfully replaced after numerous studies implementing the
kind of embodied approach we are advocating for here. These
sections will begin by describing the standard cognitive psychology
explanations for the outfielder problem and the A-not-B error. We
will then take a step back and analyze each task from an embodied
cognition perspective, asking our four key questions:
1. What is the task to be solved?
2. What are the resources that the organism has access to in order
to solve the task?
3. How can these resources be assembled so as to solve the task?
4. Does the organism, in fact, assemble, and use these resources?
EMBODIMENT IN ACTION III.I: THE OUTFIELDER PROBLEM
How does a baseball outfielder catch a fly ball? There are many
factors that make this task difficult; the fielder is far away from the
batter, the ball is optically very small and remains so until it is very
close to the fielder, the fielder has to move from their starting loca-
tion to the location where the ball will land at some point in the
future, and they have to arrive at this location in time to intercept
the ball.
The standard explanation
The initial hypothesis is that we catch fly balls by predicting their
future location based on the physics of the ball’s motion. A fly
ball is an instance of projectile motion, and the physics of this
kind of ballistic flight are relatively straight-forward. For an object
of a given size and mass, the primary variables that determine
the flight are initial direction, velocity, and angle (plus some local
constants such as drag, air density, and gravity). Saxberg (1987a,b)
suggested that outfielders perceive these initial parameters and
then use them as input to an internal simulation (representation)
of projectile motion. This representation allows outfielders to pre-
dict the future location of the ball (Trajectory Prediction). Once
the future location of the ball has been predicted, the fielder can
simply run to that location and wait.
The embodied solution
Saxberg’s (1987a,b) solution assumes that the act of catching a fly
ball is a lot like solving a physics problem, relying on some limited
resources (the ball’s initial conditions) and some internal simula-
tion. In contrast, the embodied solution first asks if that’s true by
asking “What are the resources that are available in this task, and
how might they help a person trying to catch a ball?”
What is the task to be solved?
A fielder stands in the outfield of a baseball diamond, around 250 ft
from home plate. The batter pops a fly ball (projectile motion along
a parabolic trajectory) into the air and the fielder must locomote
from where they are, to where the ball will be when it hits the
ground (hopefully in time to catch it before it hits the ground).
So, the fielder’s task is to move themselves so that they arrive at
the right place at the right time to intercept a fly ball. Sometimes
fielders are in a direct line with the flight of the ball, but the general
problem to be solved involves the fielder being off to one side.
What are the resources available?
The first thing to note is that, at the distances involved, the opti-
cal projection of the baseball is tiny. Any attempt to figure out
how far away the ball is and where it’s going using changes in
optical projection size will be riddled with errors (if it’s possible
at all; Cutting and Vishton, 1995). These errors would propagate
through any simulation, which makes solutions based on com-
puting simulations of projectile motion unstable. This means that
the simulation solution is not a likely resource (and in fact the
evidence suggests it is not an option; Shaffer and McBeath, 2005).
What else is available?
To identify the full range of available resources, we need to
understand the physical properties of the fly ball event. Events
unfold over time, and are distinguished from one another by their
underlying dynamics (which describe both how the system changes
over time and the forces which produced the change; Bingham,
1995). In the present example, the relevant dynamics are that of
projectile motion. As a given example of the projectile motion
dynamic plays out, it creates kinematic information which can be
detected and used by an observer. Kinematic descriptions include
only how the system changes over time, without reference to the
underlying forces. Perceptual systems can only detect kinematic
patterns, but observers actually want to know about the under-
lying dynamic event; this is the perceptual bottleneck (Bingham,
1988). Kinematics can specify the underlying dynamics, however
(Runeson and Frykholm, 1983) and detecting a specifying kine-
matic pattern is equivalent to perceiving the underlying dynamic
(solving the bottleneck problem and allowing direct perception as
suggested by Gibson, 1966, 1979). The information that an out-
fielder might use to continuously guide their actions to the future
position of the ball must therefore be kinematic and specific to
this future position.
The batter provides the initial conditions of the ball’s trajectory
(direction, velocity, and angle) and, after that, the flight unfolds
according to the dynamics of projectile motion. This dynamic pro-
duces motion along a parabolic trajectory. The form of this motion
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is that the ball initially rises and decelerates until it reaches a peak
height when its velocity reaches zero; it then accelerates as it falls
down the other side of the parabola. This motion is the kinematic
information that is available to the observer.
The fielder also brings resources with them: these include the
ability to detect kinematic information and (most usefully) to
locomote over a range of speeds along any trajectory across the
field.
How might these resources be assembled to solve the task?
How can the perceptual information specifying the dynamics of
the fly ball be used in conjunction with the fielder’s ability to
perceive kinematics and locomote? The parabolic flight of the ball
creates the possibility of two basic solutions. Each strategy requires
the outfielder to move in a particular way so as to offset some aspect
of the parabolic flight, either the acceleration or the curve of the
path. If the fielder is able to successfully offset either the accelera-
tion or the curve of the path, then they will end up in the right place
in the right time to intercept the ball. When reading about these
solutions in more detail below notice that neither one requires the
fielder to predict anything about the ball’s future location, only to
move in a particular way with respect to the ball’s current motion;
this is prospective control (e.g., Montagne et al., 1999).
The first solution is called optical acceleration cancelation
(OAC; e.g., Chapman, 1968; Fink et al., 2009) and requires the
fielder to align themselves with the path of the ball and run so as
to make the ball appear to move with constant velocity. The sec-
ond strategy is called linear optical trajectory (LOT; e.g., McBeath
et al., 1995) and requires the fielder to move laterally so as to make
the ball appear to trace a straight line. Which strategy is adopted
depends on where the fielder is relative to the ball (OAC works best
if the ball is coming straight for you, LOT allows you to intercept
a ball that is heading off to one side).
Does the organism, in fact, assemble, and use these resources?
The computational strategy suggests that the outfielder will run
in a straight line to the predicted landing site. This is because
the fielder computes the future landing site based on input vari-
ables that the fielder detects before setting off. Since the shortest
path to a known landing site in open terrain is a straight line,
the fielder should run directly to the place where they intercept
the ball. Outfielders do not typically run in straight lines, ruling
the computational strategy out. LOT and OAC predict either a
curving path or one with a velocity profile that offsets the acceler-
ation of the ball. The evidence generally favors LOT (e.g., McBeath
et al., 1995) but there is evidence that OAC is a viable and utilized
strategy under certain conditions (e.g., Fink et al., 2009).
These solutions have numerous advantages over the computa-
tional solution. First, instead of relying on an initial estimate of
the ball’s motion, which could be in error, they allow the fielder
to continuously couple themselves to the ball. This coupling pro-
vides fielders with numerous opportunities for error detection and
correction. Second, the strategies provide a continuous stream of
information about how well the fielder is doing. If the ball still
seems to be accelerating, or if its trajectory is still curved, this
tells the fielder both that there is an error and what to do to
fix the error. If the fielder is running flat out and is still unable
to correct the errors, this specifies an uncatchable ball, and the
fielder should switch to intercepting the ball on the bounce instead.
The affordance property “catchableness” is therefore continuously
and directly specified by the visual information, with no internal
simulation or prediction required.
Summary
In both LOT and OAC, various task resources (the motion of the
ball, the fielder, and the relation between them specified by the
kinematics of the ball viewed by the moving observer) have been
assembled into a task-specific device (Bingham, 1988) to solve the
task at hand (intercepting the projectile). This assembly is smart,
in the sense described by Runeson (1977); it takes advantage of
certain local facts of the matter to create a robust but task-specific
solution (neither LOT nor OAC are a general solution to the prob-
lem of interception, for example). The most important lesson here
is that the relation between perceptual information (about the
motion of the ball) and an organism (the outfielder) replaces the
need for internal simulation of the physics of projectile motion.
EMBODIMENT IN ACTION III.II: THE A-NOT-B ERROR
What do children know about objects and their properties, and
when do they come to this knowledge? Piaget (1954) investigated
this question by asking children of various ages to search for objects
that were hidden behind some obstacle in view of the children.
Prior to about 7 months, children simply don’t go looking for the
object, as if it has ceased to exist. From around 12 months, chil-
dren will happily go and retrieve the hidden object, seemingly now
understanding that even though they can’t see the toy they want,
it’s still there to be found. In the transition, however, children make
a rather unusual “error” – after successfully reaching several times
for a hidden object at a first location A, they will then fail to reach
for the object hidden at location B, even though the hiding hap-
pened in full view of the object. They will instead reach to A again
(hence “A-not-B error”).
There are a variety of standard cognitive explanations for this
error, but all in essence assume that (a) the child has developed
the necessary object concept that includes the knowledge that
objects persist even when out of view but (b) there is something
about reaching that cannot tap that knowledge reliably. The child’s
underlying competence can be demonstrated using looking behav-
ior as a measure, for example; children look longer at displays
showing the error trial, suggesting they know something is not
right (e.g., Baillargeon and Graber, 1988). The problem, there-
fore, is in the reaching performance: reaching cannot yet access
the knowledge necessary. This performance-competence distinc-
tion is a common theme in the cognitive developmental literature.
It assumes that the goal of the science is to understand the core
competence, and that to do so you must devise clever methods to
bypass the potential limitations of performance.
Thelen et al. (2001) challenged every single aspect of this
account with their embodied dynamical systems model of the
reaching task. This model was the end result of numerous exper-
iments motivated by a rejection of the performance-competence
distinction and a renewed focus on the details of the task at hand.
As Thelen et al. put it,“The A-not-B error is not about what infants
have and don’t have as enduring concepts, traits, or deficits, but
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what they are doing and have done” (p. 4). The end result was an
account of the A-not-B error that replaces object knowledge and
performance deficits with the dynamics of perceiving and acting
over time in the context of the reaching task.
What is the task to be solved?
This is actually quite a complicated question. The canonical ver-
sion of the task requires the infant to watch as an attractive toy is
hidden at location A. The child is then allowed to search for and
retrieve the object several times, after which the object is hidden
at location B in full sight of the baby.
One of the inspirations for pursuing a dynamical system,
embodied approach here was that almost every parameter of this
task is known to affect infants’ performance. These parameters
include the distance to the targets, the distinctiveness of the covers,
the delay between hiding and search, what the infant is searching
for (food or a toy), whether the infant is moved and how much
crawling experience they have (see Thelen et al., 2001 for a detailed
overview). If the A-not-B error reflects object knowledge, why do
these factors matter so much?
To get a handle on this question, the first thing that Thelen
et al. (2001) did was to enumerate the details of the canonical task
(Section 2.2) so that they had a clear understanding of the available
resources that might impact infants’ performance. First, the infant
gets continuous visual input (Section 2.2.1) from two wells in a
box placed a certain distance away from the child and apart from
one another. The experimenter draws the infant’s attention to the
object, and then hides the object in well A. This specific visual input
(Section 2.2.2) indicates which well the reaching target is in. After
a short delay (Section 2.2.3) during which infants typically look
at the cued location, they perform a visually guided reach (Section
2.2.4) to retrieve the object. This reach requires them to remember
(Section 2.2.5) the location of the hidden object for the duration
of the delay. This is repeated several times until the switch to the
B location, at which point the infants make the error around 70–
80% of the time (depending on their developmental status; Section
2.2.6).
What are the resources available?
In this version of the task, the resources that might impact per-
formance include the details of the continuous and specific visual
input, the length of the delay, and the delay’s relationship to the
temporal dynamics of the memory of the previous reaches. The
infant also brings resources to the task. For instance, their perfor-
mance depends on their ability to maintain visual attention and
the way in which they perform visually guided reaches. Thelen
et al. (2001) do not include an object concept as a resource. The
purpose of this seeming omission is to see how well they can model
the behavior without invoking any core competence separate from
observed performance.
How might these resources be assembled to solve the task?
The reason why this work by Thelen et al. (2001) is such a pow-
erful example of replacement style embodied cognition is that
their model is an excellent example of using dynamical systems to
explain how perceptual and embodied resources might be assem-
bled to produce an error that, on the face of it, seems to require
a representational explanation (in the form of an infant’s object
concept). The model specifies two locations in a metric field repre-
senting the infant’s reach space and takes specific perceptual input
about where to reach. This input raises activation at the appro-
priate location in the motor planning field and generates a reach
in the right direction once a threshold is crossed. Reach direction
planning unfolds continuously over time using population coding
(c.f. Georgopoulos, 1995). Activation in this field has a temporal
dynamic that prevents it from fading immediately; the movement
planning field has memory about its recent behavior. Activations
at different locations in the field interact, allowing for competition
and cooperation between them. The model is initialized and pre-
sented with specific input; the behavior of the model emerges as
the various competing dynamics (specific input, task input, mem-
ory, reach planning, etc.) unfold and change the shape of the field
controlling reaching. By the time the specific input is switched to
location B, the field has taken on a shape which reflects this compe-
tition, and the perceptual input from B is effectively being detected
by a very different system than the one which first detected input
from location A. Its behavior is correspondingly different; specif-
ically, if the parameters match the canonical version of the task,
the model will make the A-not-B error. Note there is no mention
of an “object concept” in the model specification. Yet, the model
is able to re-create the A-not-B error simply by implementing a
reach system with its own dynamical properties.
Does the organism, in fact, assemble, and use these resources?
The model is extremely successful at capturing the key phenomena
of the A-not-B task. It also captures how performance is affected
by changes to task details (e.g., variation in reach delay, changes in
object properties). Object concept based explanations have been
proposed for these effects (e.g., see Diamond’s, 2001 response to
Thelen et al.’s, 2001 target article). However, there are other aspects
of task performance that object concept explanations struggle to
cope with. Most interestingly, the model predicts and then explains
the novel experimental finding that the A-not-B error occurs in the
absence of hidden objects (Smith et al., 1999). If there is no object
to remember, then object concept based explanations are at a loss
to explain why the error persists; after all, there is no object to
conceptualize. In contrast, the embodied model predicts that the
“error” comes from the immature dynamics of reaching, and not
an incomplete object concept. This then suggests that you should
be able to generate the error in older children by increasing the
complexity of the reaching requirements. Consistent with this,
Smith et al. (1999) and Spencer et al. (2001) generated the error in
2 year olds and similar reach biases have been observed in children
up to 11 (Hund and Spencer, 2003) and even adults (Spencer and
Hund, 2002). There is no clear reason to expect these biases on the
basis of an object concept explanation. The best explanation for
this pattern of results is that the observed reaching behavior does
indeed emerge from the kind of embodied task dynamic described
by the model.
Summary
The A-not-B task has a long history of explanations based in stan-
dard, representational cognitive psychology. These explanations
assume that the reach is an error caused by an incomplete object
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concept, to which the immature motor system has limited access
until around the age of 12 months. Thelen et al.’s (2001) embod-
ied approach replaces the object concept with the dynamics of
reaching to grasp and successfully accounts for the wide variety
of context effects, as well as explaining novel versions of the error
generated without any hidden objects and in older children.
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION HYPOTHESIS FOR EMBODIMENT:
CONCEPTS AND GROUNDING
We have identified embodied cognition as a cluster of research tied
together by the same basic research strategy; (1) identify the task
at hand, (2) identify the resources available within that task space
that might help an organism solve the task, (3) generate hypotheses
about how these resources are assembled and coordinated (per-
haps formalizing this hypothesis in a model; see Bingham, 2001,
2004a,b for another example, and Golonka and Wilson, 2012 for
a detailed analysis of that model), and finally (4) empirically test
whether people, indeed, use these resources assembled in this way.
This is not, however, the only style of research going under the
banner of embodiment, and it’s fair to ask on what basis we are
ruling this other research out from our classification.
Many examples fall under what Shapiro (2011) calls the concep-
tualization hypothesis. This is the hypothesis that how we conceive
of our world is grounded in and constrained by the nature of the
perception-action systems that we are (our bodies). For exam-
ple, Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) describe how common
metaphors are typically grounded in the nature of our bodies and
experiences in the world (the future is forward, power is up, rela-
tionships are a journey). This style of research doesn’t seek to
replace the concept with a different process. Instead, it looks to
find examples where use of the concept can be primed or altered
by manipulations of the grounding state of the body.
There are many recent examples of this type of research in
the literature; we will briefly focus on two representative studies.
The first claims to demonstrate how a state of the body affects
our access to a mental representation for magnitude estimation
(Eerland et al., 2011) while the second claims to show an effect in
the other direction, with a mental state biasing the body state the
mental state is supposedly grounded in Miles et al. (2010).
Leaning to the left makes the Eiffel Tower seem smaller
People can generate sensible estimates of the magnitude of things,
such as the height of the Eiffel Tower, even when they don’t know
the exact answer. These magnitudes are hypothesized to be gen-
erated by a mental representation of magnitudes organized like a
number line, with small numbers at the left end and larger num-
bers to the right (Restle, 1970). Eerland et al. (2011) had people
stand balanced slightly to the left or to the right of center to test
the hypothesis that this postural bias would make either the left or
right end of the number line more accessible. If it did, then people
should be primed to generate lower estimates of magnitude when
leaning left and greater ones when leaning right.
The results were mixed. When people leaned left they did, on
average, make slightly smaller estimates than when leaning right
and the authors concluded that these data support the hypothesis;
access to the mental number line, arranged left to right, is, at least,
partly grounded in the left to right sway of the body. It should
be noted, however, that the effect size was very small, the effect
was not observed for all the questions, and there was no effect of
leaning to the right.
Thinking about the future makes you sway forward
The second example of conceptualization style research is Miles
et al. (2010), who had people engage in “mental time travel” by
thinking about events in either the past of the future. They mea-
sured postural sway at the knee, and found that as people thought
about the future this sway was biased toward the front (the future
is in front ). When people thought about events in the past, their
sway was biased backward (the past is behind). Again the effect was
small (peaking at a bias of approximately 2 mm in each direction)
but the authors concluded that their data demonstrate a connec-
tion between the state of the body and the contents of the cognitive
representation of time.
Where is the embodiment?
Neither of these studies begins with a task analysis and neither
considers what perceptual and embodied resources are available
to solve the task. This eliminates the opportunity to discover what
substantive role these resources can play in cognition. Instead, the
assumption made in both these studies is that the task is solved
internally, representationally, by a cognitive process that can tweak
or be tweaked by a state of the body. There isn’t any compulsory,
critical, constitutive role for the body and environment in the pro-
posed mechanism for solving the task at hand, as there is in all
the other work reviewed. You cannot catch a fly ball without mov-
ing. The fielder’s movement inevitably creates the information for
either LOT or OAC, which can then structure the observed behav-
ior. You cannot do the A-not-B task without reaching. Reaching
inevitably invokes the dynamics of visually guided reaching, which
can then structure the observed behavior. You can, however, lean
left and not have it affect your estimates of magnitude, and you
can think about the future without leaning forward. Conceptual-
ization style embodiment research does not identify the body as
a task-critical resource, nor does it generate any formal account
of how the body forms part of a task-specific solution to the task
at hand. At best, it demonstrates that sometimes thoughts and
actions go together.
TAKING THE NEXT STEP – AN EMBODIED ANALYSIS OF
LANGUAGE
This paper has laid out what we propose is a necessary research
strategy for a genuine embodied cognitive science. We’ve looked
at a progression of existing research that follows this strategy,
beginning with simple robotic systems up through non-human
animal behavior, and on to two cases of human behavior – one
straight-forward perception-action system (catching a fly ball) and
one more traditional cognitive task (the A-not-B task). The point
was to show that this approach is productive across a wide vari-
ety of tasks and behaviors, and that it demonstrates the kind of
continuity evolutionary theory tells us exists across biology.
We would like to round this article out with an initial foray into
an embodied analysis of that classic cognitive task, language. Our
goal here is simply to take what we think is the first step: identi-
fying the nature of a critical resource present in a language event,
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specifically the form and content of linguistic information. This
can then guide and constrain the non-representational empirical
investigations that we hope will follow.
LANGUAGE: IT’S SPECIAL, BUT IT’S NOT MAGICAL
Most psychologists generally assume that catching a fly ball and
talking about catching a fly ball are two different kinds of task, in
the sense that you can’t use the tools appropriate to studying how
to catch a fly ball to understand how we communicate through
language. Language is a very interesting kind of behavior, and it
has some properties that make it very special. But it is not magical;
it is a product of evolution, the same as the rest of our behavior,
so it makes perfect sense to expect it to be amenable to the analy-
ses that have been so successful in other domains. In other words,
our first move is simply to treat perception-action problems and
language problems as the same kind of thing.
As we will discuss shortly, there is one important difference to
worry about, specifically in how perceptual and linguistic infor-
mation come to have their meaning. This difference, however, can
only be seen by the third person, scientific analysis of the situa-
tion. An embodied approach should never forget that it’s trying
to explain the first person experience of the organism (a point
made forcefully by Barrett, 2011) and from this perspective there
is no difference at all between the two types of information. In its
day-to-day life the organism never gets to “peer behind the cur-
tain” – kinematic patterns in energy arrays are all we ever have
access to. The job of the learning organism is to detect these pat-
terns, and come to learn what they mean by using that information
to do something. If you can use some information to intercept a
fly ball, then you have demonstrated that you know that that’s
what the information means. Similarly, if you can use linguistic
information to reply correctly to an interlocutor, you have again
demonstrated that you know that that’s what the information
means. The basic process is the same; learn to detect the relevant
structure and learn to use it appropriately.
HOW INFORMATION GETS ITS MEANING
Events in the world are identified by their underlying dynam-
ics; these dynamics create kinematic patterns in energy arrays
and these patterns can serve as perceptual information about the
dynamics that created them (Bingham, 1995). For perception,
structure in an energy array is about the dynamic event in the
world that created the structure in the moment (for example, the
optical information created by the motion of a fly ball is about
the motion of the fly ball). This relationship is underwritten by
ecological laws (Turvey et al., 1981) and detecting the information
allows the organism to perceive the dynamical event.
Every language event (speech, writing, gesture) also creates
structure in energy arrays (speech creates acoustic structure; writ-
ing and gesture creates optical structure). To an organism capable
of language use, this structure can serve as linguistic information,
and because we are treating them as the same kind of thing, we can
analyze linguistic information the same way we analyze perceptual
information. The only difference between perceptual information
and linguistic information is in the relationship between the struc-
ture in the energy array and the meaning of the information.
For language, the structure in the energy array is not about the
dynamics of, say, articulation; it’s about whatever the words mean.
The structure comes to have this meaning because of the social
conventions of the language environment and what we learn is,
therefore, a conventional meaning of the pattern. This conven-
tional underpinning gives stability to linguistic information, but
the difference between a law and a convention is very important.
Conventions can change and so can the meaning of words; lan-
guage is much less stable than perception. This decreased stability
is, of course, a fact of language to be explained, so perhaps it is not
a disaster for the analogy we are developing here.
DOWE NEED REPRESENTATION?
This is the point where standard cognitive science usually jumps
in and claims that conventional meaning requires representational
support. Linguistic information is created by the unfolding of a
complex dynamic in the present time, but the meaning of this
information is the conventional one that may be about something
not present at that time; we can talk about things in their absence
in a way that has no analogy in perception. So in what sense can
linguistic information have meaning if not in the form of internal
models of the people, objects, places, etc., to which the words refer?
This sticking point is, to some extent, a product of the form of
the question. To ask what a word means implies something sta-
tic and internal – words have meanings. So, our approach here is
to ask the same question in a different way. As we said earlier, if
someone is able to respond appropriately to linguistic information,
then it is fair to say that this person knows what the information
means. Instead of asking how we learn the meaning of words, we
can ask, instead, how do we learn to use and respond to linguistic
information? Can we respond appropriately to linguistic informa-
tion without possessing mental representations? As discussed in
the previous sections on robotics, quite interesting, and complex
behavior can emerge without explicit internal models of it. Still,
none of these robots used language.
In perception, the argument goes, representations are not nec-
essary because the specification relationship between perceptual
information and the world makes perceiving the information iden-
tical to perceiving the world (Gibson, 1966, 1979; Turvey et al.,
1981). What this means is that organisms can respond appropri-
ately to perceptual information without the need to cognitively
enrich the perceptual input. The critical issue for language is
whether the conventional relationship between linguistic infor-
mation and what that information is about is sufficient to support
something like direct perception.
Chemero (2009) has an extensive argument about how conven-
tion can indeed be sufficient, as part of his suggestion that even
perceptual information can be grounded in convention. Specifi-
cally, he uses conventions as defined by the situation semantics of
Barwise and Perry (1983) and we suggest that this analysis will
be the place to begin to address this question in the future. To
summarize the key points, Barwise and Perry proposed that infor-
mation is created for organisms by situations; a given situation
will be an instance (token) of a type of situation, and situations
can be connected by constraints. If two types of situation, S1 and
S2, are connected via a constraint, then a token S2 is informa-
tive about a token S1 by virtue of that constraint. An organism
has access to that information if and only if they have access to
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one of the tokens and the constraint. This is precisely the case in
the example of language. If S1 is “the situation being discussed”
and S2 is “the language event of the discussion,” these are con-
nected by the constraints of the local language environment. By
this account, a token of S2 (e.g., the utterance “the rain in Spain
stays mainly in the plain”) is informative about a token of S1 (the
typical pattern of rain fall in Spain) but only to a skilled user of the
English language. If the utterance was instead “La lluvia en España
se mantiene principalmente en la llanura,” our English language
user would not be informed about S1 because they don’t have
access to the relevant constraints of Spanish. Situation semantics
provides a formal language for talking about how linguistic infor-
mation can be informative about the world even despite its basis
in convention. There is much work still to do here, but as Chemero
(2009) notes, this framework has the benefit of treating specifying
and conventional information as the same kind of thing and it
therefore seems like a good place to start a non-representational
account of language meaning.
It is worth saying outright that arguing against the need for rep-
resentations to support language is not the same thing as claiming
that the brain has no role in language. The brain is clearly involved
(as it is involved in perception/action) and an embodied approach
to language will need to engage with this fact, so long as hypotheses
about what the brain is doing are consistent with the embodied
analysis we are applying here. For example, there is a literature
on the coupling between articulation and neural dynamics as a
mechanism for language comprehension. This work focuses on
the production of syllables and models that in terms of oscillator
dynamics which can then be coupled to the oscillator dynamics
of the cortex (Luo and Poeppel, 2007; Giraud and Poeppel, 2012;
Peelle and Davis, 2012). There is some dispute about whether
the syllable is the correct phonetic level of analysis (Cummins,
2012), but regardless, the form of this argument matches parts of
the analysis we propose here. In particular, this framework sug-
gests a way to link linguistic information to cortical dynamics.
Thus, in principle, there is no need to invoke representations to
explain how linguistic information can precipitate actions. The
non-representational alternative is a non-linear dynamical sys-
tem where structure in energy arrays (in the form of perceptual
and linguistic information) cause changes in cortical dynamics,
which are coupled to limbs, mouths, etc., capable of taking action.
Taking action (moving, speaking) changes the landscape of per-
ceptual and/or linguistic information, which impacts the cortical
dynamics, and so on.
LANGUAGE, THOUGH SPECIAL, IS AMENABLE TO AN EMBODIED
ANALYSIS
We create linguistic information (e.g., speech or written text)
to achieve goals (e.g., directing and regulating the behavior of
ourselves and others). The dynamical system creating linguis-
tic information entails the coupled dynamics of the articulators
and the brain, both of which are nested in a socially defined lan-
guage environment with its own dynamical properties. Language
dynamics are therefore complex and defined across multiple cou-
pled dynamical systems, but linguistic information is still being
created by a dynamical event the same way perceptual information
is; they are not different in kind.
This information is a critical task resource, in exactly the same
way as perceptual information is a critical task resource. In fact, we
argue that the similarities between the two are strong enough to
import the analyses used with perception directly over to an analy-
sis of language. The most important similarity is that from the first
person perspective of a perceiving, acting language user, learning
the meaning of linguistic information, and learning the meaning of
perceptual information is the same process. The differences in the
behavior supported by these two types of information (which are,
indeed, important) arise from the differences in the way these two
types of information come about and connect to their meaning.
But the similarities mean the same basic approach to studying how
we use information to perceive meaning can apply to language as
much as to perception and action; a step forward in and of itself.
Although language is clearly a tremendous step up in terms
of the complexity of the dynamics involved, the essential form of
the analysis can remain the same. Linguistic information is a task
resource in exactly the same way as perceptual information is a
task resource, and we should treat it as such when we try to figure
out how it fits into the task-specific device an organism is forming
to solve a given problem. We suggest that it is vital to exhaust this
strategy first, before leaping to the conclusion that it simply can’t
be done without the representations that many other cognitive
systems just don’t seem to require.
OTHER EMBODIED APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE: ANOTHER NOTE ON
GROUNDING
This is not the first attempt to embody language, but the previ-
ous efforts are more in line with the conceptualization hypothesis
we reviewed above and suffer from the problems we highlighted
there (as well as others; see Willems and Francken, 2012). They
hypothesize that meaning is grounded in a simulation of previous
experiences, a simulation which would include embodied elements
of those previous experiences. Tasks measuring comprehension
should reflect the presence of this kind of simulation (Barsa-
lou, 1999). Two high profile attempts to measure these embodied
simulation effects are the action-sentence compatibility effect (e.g.,
Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002) and the sentence-picture verification
task (e.g., Stanfield and Zwaan, 2001).
Action-sentence compatibility
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) had participants rate whether sen-
tences were sensible. Some of the sentences implied a directional
movement (e.g.,“close the drawer” implies a movement away from
the person). Participants responded by moving to press a but-
ton, and the movement was either compatible or not with the
implied direction in the sentence. Participants were faster when
the response direction and the implied direction were compat-
ible, and slower when they were not. The authors suggest that
this demonstrates people are mentally simulating the action in the
sentence in order to comprehend the sentence; “language under-
standing is grounded in bodily action” (Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002, p. 562).
Sentence-verification task
Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) tested the simulation hypothesis by
providing people with sentences that implied an orientation for
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an object, e.g., “the pencil is in the cup” implies a vertical ori-
entation while “the pencil is in the drawer” implies a horizontal
orientation. They then showed people a picture of the object in a
compatible or incompatible orientation and asked people to ver-
ify if the pictured object matched the sentence; participants were
faster to respond in the compatible condition and vice versa.
The major problem with this research is that it again assumes
all the hard work is done in the head, with perception and action
merely tweaking the result. Before this type of research can tell
us anything meaningful about language comprehension, more
work must be done to answer some basic questions. There is
no account of the resources that exist in the task presented to
participants, and this is a critical part of identifying what the
task is from the participants’ perspective. For example, what is
the information content of a picture of an object, what are the
dynamics of button pressing behavior (or any response type being
used), and what is the relationship between these two things –
what happens if you try to control the latter using the former?
These are not easy questions; for example, Gibson himself high-
lighted how difficult it is to establish exactly what the information
content of a picture of something actually is (Gibson, 1979). But
without this, you cannot begin to explain how hearing different
sentences influences a button press response to those pictures.
There may indeed be a story there; after all, the results have been
demonstrated multiple times. But it is a story remaining to be
told, and as in the rest of the work surveyed here, we think that
the answer to these questions will likely lead to mental simula-
tions being replaced the relevant dynamics identified by a task
analysis.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a German teacher
named Wilhelm von Osten owned a horse called Hans. Hans,
he claimed, could count and do simple maths and he demon-
strated this ability for several years in free shows. It wasn’t
until psychologist Oskar Pfungst tested this claim rigorously
that the truth was revealed: Hans did not know maths, but
he did know to stop tapping his hoof when his owner indi-
cated that he had reached the correct answer (by visibly but
subconsciously relaxing; von Osten was not a fraud). Abstract
knowledge such as how to add is typically seen as requiring
some form of internal representational state, but here, the cog-
nitive explanation (that Hans had the internal ability to count)
was replaced by a straight-forward perceptual coupling to his
environment.
The story of Clever Hans has stood as a cautionary tale in psy-
chology ever since; identifying an organism’s actual solution to
a problem requires the ability to identify all the potential solu-
tions to a task followed by careful experimental testing to identify
which of all the possible options are actually being used. This
remains as true now as it did in 1907 when Pfungst ran his
tests.
Standard cognitive science proceeds under two related assump-
tions that interfere with its ability to identify the actual solu-
tions. These are poverty of stimulus, and the consequent
need for internal, representational enrichment of perception.
The objects and processes of standard cognitive psychology
have a specific job to do that reflects the hypothesized
need to enrich perceptual information. But these assump-
tions mean that cognitive research never even tests the gen-
uinely embodied alternative solutions we now know are viable
options.
Replacement style embodied cognition removes these assump-
tions and instead looks at all the resources in the environment
that might support complex behavior and, critically, the infor-
mation that might serve to tie them together. One of the most
important discoveries of the last 40 years has been that there is,
in fact, rich and varied information in the environment (Gib-
son, 1966, 1979)3 that we are able to use to produce all manner
of complex behaviors. The availability of this high quality per-
ceptual information removes the need to invoke any additional
cognitive constructs to explain interesting behaviors. Our behav-
ior emerges from a pool of potential task resources that include
the body, the environment and, yes, the brain. Careful analysis is
required to discover exactly which of these resources and the rela-
tions between them form the actual solution used to solve a given
task.
It is true that replacement style embodied cognition cannot
currently explain everything that we do (Shapiro, 2011). Even
some of the most enthusiastic researchers in embodied cogni-
tion think that there are “representation hungry” problems, which
simply cannot be solved without something like an object or
process from standard cognitive psychology (Clark and Toribio,
1994); language is the major case here. We are more optimistic.
All that we can really conclude at this time is that replacement
style embodied cognition cannot explain these problems yet. We
believe that there is no principled reason why these behaviors
cannot be explained with replacement style embodied solutions,
given that human beings are, we think, best described as the
kind of perceiving, acting, embodied, non-linear dynamical sys-
tems doing the replacing. This optimism reflects the successes
we’ve described here, and especially the fact that when embodied
cognition researchers have turned their attention to “representa-
tion hungry” problems, they have actually had great success. The
embodied analysis of the A-not-B error remains the best example
of this; it literally replaces “thinking about things in their absence”
with embodied action. Another example is the work with Por-
tia spiders (see above and Barrett, 2011 for a review). We have
suggested a further step forward here, with an initial analysis of
language that replaces what words mean with what language lets
us do; of course, it remains to be seen if this is as successful (but,
see also Port and Leary, 2005; Port, 2007; for more on tackling
language).
Replacement style embodied cognition research has produced
methods, formal tools (primarily in the form of dynamical sys-
tems models) and a great number of empirical successes. The
explanations it produces place embodiment at the center of the
organism’s solution to a given task, rather than on the periph-
ery, and this is the research we feel deserves the name embodied
cognition.
3Three recent reviews of how Gibson’s work in visual perception underpins much
of the embodied cognition literature include Barrett (2011), Chemero (2009), and
Shapiro (2011).
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